Introduction.

This essay, I hope, is a fair and reasoned treatment of religious claims. I have tried to address the reasons for accepting these claims as part of ones beliefs in as thorough a manner as I am able. This essay is a work in progress, and is constantly under revision, so any criticisms of it, or suggestions as to what else may need covering, or indeed any comments on it whatsoever, are very welcome at the comments section below.

Much of the content of this essay is applicable to other religions, but in places I have addressed Christianity directly (including the God Arguments, which are all from Christian Theology) since it is for the reason of Christian influence upon my life that I have been able to interact with religion and so feel that it is a force that needs to be understood. Atheism, as a term, means the lack of belief in or the denial of the existence of God (negative atheism and positive atheism respectively). As a term it does not necessarily encompass views on religious belief, even though most religious practises would be bereft of content if theism (the belief in a God or Gods) were taken from it. Buddhism, for example, does not have a Godhead, yet it is a system of religious belief. I need to make it clear, then, that criticising religious beliefs in general is my goal here as well as making clear arguments for positive atheism (as far as I am aware there is no suitable banner term).

The main thrust of this essay is to show that coming to hold religious beliefs is epistemologically unreasonable, and that people should be therefore dissuaded from coming to hold religious belief for the reasons presented. Also, those who already hold religious beliefs, upon recognizing their beliefs as ‘bad’ (i.e. not truth-preserving), should cease to believe them. To deal with these latter groups of people regarding the difficulty of the move into disbelief, I will later in the essay address whether holding onto religious beliefs is a desirable activity.

To begin with, I need to stress that nothing I can say here necessarily means anything at all, as it is always possible that people will simply choose not accept the assumption that I make in writing such a critical piece in the first place. I should, therefore, try to deal with this assumption first, for if a person doubts it in the first place, how can I have any basis from which people can accept my criticisms?

The assumption that I am making in writing this text in the first place is that it is appropriate for me to criticize religious beliefs. If you do not accept that it is appropriate, then I could be typing away until my fingers fall off and it wouldn’t make the slightest bit of difference. It is necessary to seek your agreement on the properness of this project.

Belief and criticism

To address this assumption, then, I should start by looking at criticism of belief in general. We criticize beliefs for the same reason that we have for choosing to hold them – the desire for truth. For instance, if we believe something because we think that it reflects the truth, and then we find out that it does not, we cease to believe it. This is because truth is the criteria for choosing belief. So something that is true is always preferred over something that is untrue, and this is why people criticize beliefs – to ensure that the beliefs held are truthful. Criticism is therefore part and parcel of holding beliefs.

There is a popular problem with questioning beliefs, and this is relativism, which denies criticism on the basis that all beliefs are expressions of necessarily different perspectives and are all equally valid. Relativism is a problem in that it does not allow prioritization of different beliefs in any respect. Interestingly, if relativism thus stated were a belief, we would not believe much else. To choose something we are said to be judging and prioritizing, and in choosing beliefs we are demonstrating our judgment that it is better to hold those beliefs than to not hold them. If relativism means that this judgment is wrong, then the choosing of beliefs is a misguided activity. What we find easy to wheel out as a dismissal of criticism thus becomes a dismissal of being able to choose beliefs in the first place.

So, hopefully with your agreement that criticizing beliefs is part of the reason for having them, and that relativism is undesirable to say the least, is there anything about religious beliefs that exclude it specifically from criticism? We must make the observation, first of all, that if religions belief is chosen because of its truthfulness, it is subject to the usual rigour of philosophical criticism that might be applied to any other kind of belief. Such criticisms have been leveled at religious claims for hundreds of years. There is, however, an obvious aspect of religious belief that may lay claim to not be of the kind that requires philosophical investigation – that is, that religious beliefs are not chosen because of their truthfulness but because of the comfort they provide and the answers to important philosophical questions that they give. Before moving on to philosophical arguments against theistic and religious beliefs, I must address this.

That religious belief gives people specific identities is beyond question – scripture has been used to determine the sexual practices of people; to determine the relationship between the sexes; to create and reinforce political structures and to in turn be reinforced by them; and to be a point of cohesive influence in political dissent. All these things and more allow for a cohesive community, which is something people naturally find desirable. Another and perhaps further-reaching and more influential way in which religion gives identity is the answers to philosophical questions it provides. Religion gives us answers to the ontology of man, an essentialist nature of ethics, and various explanations of the natural world that have reflected prevailing issues in the philosophy of science throughout history. However, above all the major philosophical notion that religion imparts is that of a belief in God or Gods, which is a somewhat multi-faceted belief labeled ‘theism’. Theism may include the belief in a kind of metaphysical older brother that is constantly looking after a person, constantly guiding them and steering their lives to a master plan. Theism may include the belief in a vengeful God, who condemns people to hell if they do not choose to follow his teaching. God may be many things, or none of those things, and there may be one God or many. Theism is a polymorphous concept that can be anything people need it to be, and it imparts a very identity-defining view of the Universe.

To deal with choosing religion because of the identity that comes from it, it is important to keep in mind that this choice to believe is made only insofar as it is a reflection of social influence, which in cycles creates and is created by religious practice. Identity in religious terms is a kind of cultural determination that also enters discussions on contemporary ideas of self and is largely political. With such explanation in mind it must be the case that the defense of this appropriation of religious belief is found to be empty, and not an influential position as to the legitimate choice for religious belief, grounded as it is in the shifting sands of culture which could always have been otherwise, making adopting religious belief unnecessary – There will be more on cultural determinism in general later.

It is the appropriation of religious belief as consistent with truth that we must be concerned with, then, and the philosophical arguments put forward by theologians as to the rightful existence of God, along with historical understandings of religious texts and events. Here I am going to touch on the main three arguments for the existence of God, and later a few basic observations that show the murkiness of scripture, arguments from authority et al.

Refutations of traditional God Arguments

Firstly, let us look briefly at three philosophical arguments for the existence of God. The Ontological argument, known as the Argument from Existence, claims to prove God’s existence through logical forms of argument. The Teleological argument, known as the Argument from Design, seeks to show how the intricate complexities and mechanical perfections of the natural world require a creator. The Cosmological argument, known as the First Cause argument, argues that the chain of cause and effect necessarily began with God.

First, to deal with the Ontological arguments very briefly: The general objection to them is that they are all non-starters, as they beg the question by assuming the existence of God in their premises. If one does not accept the existence of God, one will remain un-persuaded by these circular arguments.

The Teleological argument is probably the most controversial argument. Controversial, that is, politically, and not because it is especially convincing. The main problem with assuming that the Universe requires a creator is that we know otherwise. The implications of the scientific theory of evolution are that creatures adapt to their environments via the process of natural selection. This process is mechanically unavoidable, as each thing must act according to its nature within a system of natural laws that regulate what traits survive to reproduce the next generation, and thus well-adapted life forms eventually result (and that all phenomenal things must act according to their natures/attributes explains how particles are consistently affected by the laws of physics to create a universe that appears well-ordered - and this has been postulated as long ago as the presocratic philosopher Democritus [460BC-370BC]).

The religious objection to this is usually a form of attack upon science as a credible imparter of knowledge (and hence the ‘controversial’ label I used above). Some arguments of objection show that science is not concerned with ethics – which is fallacious in that science need not be concerned with ethics to do what it says it does; some arguments make the point that science is not an absolute truth – which anyone at least basically familiar with the philosophy of science will know, and will know that this does not undermine scientific knowledge (indeed, the scientific philosopher Karl Popper pointed out that the lack of claims to absolute truths are a distinguishing strength of scientific theorizing); and some arguments bluntly show how scientific theories go against ‘facts’ that were established in the bible – Which is an attentive observation that shows quite rightly that one of them must be right and the other wrong.

Before moving on I need to put a couple of philosophical records straight. With regards to the Ancient Greek Philosophers Plato and Aristotle, and what they are said to have believed with regard to God. It is the case that both of these philosophers have been so influential for so long that scholars, in the ages where the only scholars were church scholars, naturally felt it necessary to show that their teachings reflected the Church’s views on God. To deal firstly with Plato, with a treatment of Aristotle after a look at First Cause arguments: Plato’s writings on the Master Craftsman in the Timeaus, which was the book of cosmology for many centuries, was interpreted as an authoritative verification of Christian theism. However, Plato’s Master Craftsman is nothing at all like Jehovah, and Plato would certainly not be pleased that his concept had come to be construed in this fashion. Plato argued that the order and harmony inherent in the universe must have come about by a mind being at work. He called this the ‘Master Craftsman’. Far from being a creator God, however, the Master Craftsman was simply that – a craftsman - who applied the appropriate forms to the most fitting materials. Natural laws, and the properties of things, are all pre-existent materials that the Master Craftsman has no control over, and they direct him in the work that he does as if working from blueprints in imparting the correct forms to the correct materials. This is not a creator God, and not at all recognizable as the Christian/Jewish/Islamic God, as he is not omnipotent, nor does he preside over heaven, nor is he a personal God, nor is he any of a great many things that these other Gods are said to be.

The Cosmological argument, or the ‘First Cause’ argument as it is commonly known, argues that because every cause is the effect of another cause, there must be something that starts this chain off, and that something must be God. The first objection we can raise is to ask for the cause of God, since God is a cause, and is therefore not exempt from the universal first premise that every cause is the effect of another cause. The revised argument states that ‘everything that began to exist has a cause’, which exempts God from this infinite regression. However, since the Universe and its laws are what ‘began to exist’ there must have been a time when it did not exist. This creates a paradox, since ‘time’ is a law of the Universe, that apparently ‘began to exist’, and yet to say this infers a ‘time’ when ‘time’ did not exist. Separate from these comments, there is a general fatal flaw in the First Cause argument that cannot be denied. If we do grant by virtue of some future argument that there was a first cause of all things, and we choose to label it ‘God’, then that name means nothing more than ‘first cause’, and is not the supernatural being ‘God’ and all that entails without additional arguments. The First Cause argument, then, does not prove what it sets out to prove - that is, the existence of the Christian (or Jewish or Islamic etc) God, since a ‘first cause’ need not necessarily have the qualities that these Gods are said to possess and can in fact be wholly mechanical.

Aristotle’s work has been subverted to the Christian cause in the same way as Plato’s, but in relation to First Cause arguments rather than Teleological arguments. Aristotle spoke of an ‘unmoved mover’ that is the basis for all subsequent movement, and that this mover is ‘the love that moves the stars’ (as summarized by Dante). At first glance it appears that Aristotle’s God as unmoved mover lends weight to the Christian First Cause arguments, but this is not so. It is true that he saw there to be a ‘First Cause’ of sorts, but that this first cause is not to be understood as the limit of causal regression – as is the Christian interpretation - but of progression, and it all has to do with Aristotle’s views of cosmology. Aristotle regarded the stars and planets as somewhat like animals in that they have desires. Because of the apparent absolute uniformity of their motion and their apparent immortality, it was almost beyond question that the heavenly objects were divine – and, of course, Aristotle agreed. Aristotle thought that the planets and stars could not have ‘lower’ desires such as that which rules earthly creatures and explains their self-movement, there must be a higher desire at work in them, and Aristotle termed this ‘love’ for the unmoved mover, explaining the heavenly bodies’ circular movements. This, it is safe to say, does not correlate at all with Christian ideas of First Cause, nor does the unmoved mover correlate at all to God – it is not a personality that has intentions toward mankind, for example: indeed it is a very minimalist conception of God, which suited Aristotle’s relaxed religious views just fine. In any event, Aristotle’s argument, and what he actually meant is somewhat moot now anyhow, considering that it has been refuted quite famously by various scientific discoveries.

My treatment here of the three major God arguments has been brief to say the least, but please do feel free to peruse the Internet, which has many sites that discuss God Arguments exclusively. In critiquing the more traditional variants of the main arguments for God's existence, I do not intend to imply that the more sophisticated versions fall to the same objections.

God arguments assumed = God?

Let me digress to take God arguments on their strengths, because it isn’t even necessarily the case that more sophisticated versions of them even need to be refuted. Whether they be the traditional arguments for God, or improved, more sophisticated versions, if we grant God arguments their premises and conclusions, what do we have?

We have, for example, A creator of the universe, a perfect being, and a first cause. A first cause, as I have already mentioned, can be understood as wholly mechanical, so let us disregard this argument as not fulfilling its aim.

A ‘creator of the universe’ is not specific enough as to in any way link such a mind to any earthly religion. Indeed, what can we say about the qualities of such a creator? Is the word ‘creator’ necessarily ‘God’ or anyone’s idea of ‘God’? The particularly Christian concept of God (that the God arguments address) includes being the creator of the Universe. It does not follow logically that the creator of the Universe, should one be agreed to exist, must therefore be the Christian God. Finally, does the concept ‘creator of the universe’ explain the need for religious devotion to it in any way whatsoever? I propose that the teleological argument also does not fulfil its aim.

The Ontological argument states claims to there being a ‘perfect being’ – yet when we start thinking about how this ‘perfect being’ must be God we again run into trouble. To be clear about this, we are not talking about whether the concept of God must include the idea of being a perfect being, but whether the concept of a perfect being necessitates the concept of God and all that that entails. Exactly as in the previous consideration, it must be pointed out that while the idea established by the argument is said to be contained within the idea of God, it is not that case that God is contained in the established idea; to assume that that is the case is a basic logical fallacy. Once again also, there is also the huge problem of how the concept of a ‘perfect being’ (like the first cause above) can possibly vindicate the specifics of religious worship. Of this and the previous arguments I can only say that even when I entertain the argument as true, it is nevertheless a failure.

Let me wrap these arguments up with this observation – That not only is it the case that none of them imply God with any degree of necessity, but also that there is no reason to think that any of the God arguments even have anything to do with each other!

The historical theory of scripture.

Apart from being persuaded by God arguments, another way in which we come to accept the truth of religious belief is from historical sources such as scriptures. Those who do not prescribe to the way in which historians gather knowledge about the past will have a hard time finding the following refutations convincing. I cannot explain the historical method with any depth of knowledge of the subject, but in order to convince you of the properness of historical criticisms I need to tell you a few basic guidelines of its method and why they are followed.

History is a study of the past. It is not whole and complete, but knowledge obtained by specific methods that are necessarily delimiting. This method, however, is worked and refined so that we know as much as possible about as many things as possible as accurately as possible etc. Historical research looks through sources that it sorts into different classes, i.e. primary sources and secondary sources, where primary sources are direct, first hand accounts, and secondary sources are accounts derived from those accounts. It is natural for primary sources to carry more ‘weight’ than secondary sources, though many exemplary secondary sources exist, and it is not to say that secondary sources that are not exemplary are to be shunned either – rather they add to bodies of knowledge most irreplaceably.

Historians do not accept historical facts from hearsay. To draw a parallel as to why this is the case let us consider a court, in which a person is accused of committing a crime. If somebody is called to the stand and says that somebody else told him or her that they saw this person commit the crime, and the defendant actually gets sentenced based upon this testimony, we would call it a perversion of justice and rightly so. It does not matter whether it is one person that says they heard about it or twenty, it is not proof that the person committed the crime. What is required is for the person that actually claims to have seen the defendant commit the crime to be brought into court to testify, and that is why such a person is called a ‘witness’, because it is they that have witnessed something. This witnessing is a parallel to having a historical primary source.

If we accept this, then we cannot believe in the historical man ‘Jesus Christ’. Now, this is perhaps a rather startling consequence of the reasonable practice that you may have just been in agreement with (but now probably back-peddling from very quickly indeed). It is imperative that you think over the reasons why hearsay is omitted from legitimate historical testimony, and understand the courtroom parallel I just explained, to solidify in your own mind the correctness of such a procedure. With that done, we can look at why it is the case that we cannot accept a historical Jesus Christ.

A historical basis for anything in this timeframe must come from writings, as obviously nobody is alive to tell us anything orally. The writings that we have as potential evidence for the existence of Jesus are surprisingly few, considering how many writers were around at that time. The only account that is still contested (note that ‘contested’ is not to mean ‘accepted’) is that of Josephus, who was born in AD37 and died in AD94. Disregarding the controversy of the content of his account, and simply looking at the dates at which he lived, it is clear that he could not have met Jesus and was therefore not a ‘witness’ to a historical Jesus. He claimed that there was one, and much has been speculated of what primary sources he might have read, but we have none of these speculated sources and no reason to assume a historical Jesus existed based upon the hearsay testimony of Josephus.

The other historical source for a historical Jesus is indeed the Gospels themselves, which, like other religious scriptures, are subject to general criticisms as well as some specific ones as well. These specific problems with the Gospels include contradictions and conflictions between accounts; the proclamation of them to be authored by specific people who have no historical basis even when it is clear that some sections are authored by different people; that the story of Jesus is prefigured in many ancient mythologies.

To deal with scripture in general, the reason why scriptures are difficult to use as historical sources is that, firstly, they might be completely made up – that is to say that the original authors may have merely written stories that have eventually been construed as telling historical truths. The apparent consistencies of scriptural evidence (should there be any found) that lead us to ascribe truth to them are therefore forever in some doubt. Treating them as historical documents proves to be difficult for a number of other reasons also.

Firstly, scriptures have always been in the hands of those that have edited and amended them, so it is always in doubt as to which content is the original writings. Secondly, with this in mind in the case of the Bible; knowing that it has been wholly edited many times, and indeed many books are compilations of many stories from different periods that do not agree (see the first two books of Genesis, for example) makes for extremely shaky foundations from which to derive accurate historical knowledge from. Thirdly, scriptures are not verified in ways that lead us undoubtedly to accept the scripture as factually correct (looking for historical correlations in geography, for example, does not prove the content of the story), and always this task of verification is an unending work. Lastly, there are many religious scriptures that proclaim to describe the same events (i.e. creation, and a God), but are of different religious persuasions, and there is nothing to make any one of them more truthful than the other being as they are all scriptures.

For these reasons and others, religious scriptures are no longer the basis of our historical knowledge, and though subject to interpretation by some religious scholars with historical knowledge in mind, they cannot be assumed independently to be the basis of any historical knowledge. They can corroborate independent historical sources, but all in all the weight of religious scripture in historical investigation is weak. As persons interested in history, therefore, with a good method of sifting good evidence from bad at hand, we should of course not be interested in religious scripture as exposing history that we can rely upon as truthful. We should, if we are interested in getting as true and accurate views of history as we can, leave scripture out of the equation. And this brings us to important distinctions.

These distinctions are that religious scriptures are not typically read in historical terms according to a method to uncover its historical truths. Scriptures are read by lay peoples trying to understand the world, and these people are not necessarily interested in being historically rigorous. They find within scripture historical claims that they then accept. They accept them for reasons other than for the regard of scripture within historical study as accurate (for which there can be little case), but because they accept a different, inferior method for obtaining truths along the lines of simply believing what one is told - either for reasons of cultural determination, arguments from authority, or when all this is shown to be unreasonable, on ‘faith’. The arguments which I have addressed thus far throughout the essay can be seen perhaps as a façade for these (in my opinion) less acceptable methods. These reasons are also substituted in the philosophical arguments I mentioned before, and not just in scripture dealing with historical arguments. Let me start by addressing faith.

Faith

Firstly, what is faith? Is it untouchable? Is it better than reason? Many will say so, but it is easier dealt with than you might think. Perhaps you have read through this whole essay believing it to be so, and disregarding my arguments. I hope I can change your mind. The first question we have to ask of faith, is what exactly is it? The idea of ‘faith’ you might reply, is that questions need not be asked about it. But if we don’t know what it is, how can we know that we have it? In my experience, ‘faith’ has been described either as a lack of justification, or as the word used for a very strong belief. Obviously this latter definition is not ‘faith’ as how we come to believe something, but the state of believing something, so this is not a problem (note that belief in something as the requirement to believe in that thing is laughably circular). ‘Faith’ as coming to believe something without justification, however, is a problem that needs addressing here. It contradicts the process of choosing belief, which I talked about near the start of this essay. When we choose a belief, we judge that holding that belief is better than not holding it, so choosing to believe in God is indeed a judgment from evidence, just as choosing to believe anything else is.

Also, there must be something that makes belief in, say, God, different to a belief in ‘Zogrumundadorr’ who is a doughnut monster that I just made up. We do not have faith in ‘Zogrumundadorr’, but we do have faith in ‘God’, so there is something that sets God apart as a belief and identifies it as worthy of ‘faith’ in a way that other beliefs are not. I’m sure you can see that this is not faith as ‘lack of justification’ at all, because the identification of religious belief as worthy of faith is justification for it. ‘Faith’ therefore becomes synonymous with ‘belief’, and this ‘belief’ is justified by its identification as a set of principles that are already agreed with; so then these agreements are the justifications for the belief, and originally calling it ‘faith’ is simply wrong and deceptive. At most, using the justification of ‘faith’ is an attempt to dodge identification of the real justifications for religious belief - not that many people really sit down and ask themselves what that is, to be frank.

Cultural determination

Now that faith is suitably dealt with, I need to put forward evidence for the acceptance of assuming truths on authority or by the influences of culture as inferior and in need of purging. Firstly, to elucidate cultural determination; cases can be made for the validity of truths assumed from culture – for instance it is probably the case that most of our beliefs about the world come by this process of environmental influence. What is important is what happens to these imparted beliefs once we hold them – do we question whether these beliefs are true and justified? If the answer is yes, should we ask for all such knowledge to be rigorously philosophically verified? This discussion can wait for another time, since we are only here concerned with religious belief, which will be examined whether we think that we should examine every culturally imparted belief, or whether we think that there should be degrees of priority where some beliefs are certainly to be examined, with some beliefs attributed a lesser urgency of examination (where religious beliefs must come pretty much right at the top of such a system, being as it is a most powerfully influential discourse on the understanding of life).

The main criticism to understand about the idea of assuming that culturally imparted beliefs are true is that we only think so insofar as they are imparted successfully - by degrees of rigorousness or repetitiveness or the requirement of them for social acceptance, and these things are not devices that impart beliefs that are necessarily true. If we thought that this were the case we would be severely contradicted by the differences in beliefs held by different cultures. In order for this to carry weight we need to keep in mind that religious belief includes truths about the natural world as well as moral truths or more acceptable things that live in cultural influence more properly and acceptably. For universal truths about the natural world to be able to apply consistently (which they must, necessarily) there must be non-culturally anchored arguments for them – indeed something that Science recognizes. So, religious belief, when appropriated as a cultural determination, is not able to support much of what it claims to be true.

Arguments from authority

Dealing with arguments from authority is an easy task. Quite simply, that somebody tells you that something is the case does not mean that it truly is the case. Let us then look closely at the priest, whose job it is to communicate religious truth to (mostly) lay people through the authority of his appointed position. Is it the case that the priest has his appointed position because he knows the truth and how to communicate it? To assert this is to say that priests know that God exists, amongst other religious claims, and that they can communicate this knowledge. If this is so then priests are unscrupulous fellows indeed, seeing as how they do not communicate such truths (indeed if they had I would not have any content for this essay). Of course, that priests have knowledge that proves of the truthfulness of religious beliefs, which for some reason they choose not to share, is a silly idea. Every argument we have from people with any religious authority has fallen short (again, hence this essay), so it must be reasonable to say that those with religious authority do not have any more monopoly on religious truth than a layman. Note that we cannot augment the authority of anybody within a religious organization with that familiar claim of appointment from ‘God’, as this is a circular argument, since belief in God is one of those beliefs that are claimed on the authority of those people (and of course this applies readily to arguments from scripture too). The only thing we can say about arguments from authority is that we can only accept such authority on the basis that it is able to provide adequate communication of reasoned claims to knowledge – and since this does not require authority, we are back where we started with simple knowledge claims.

I hope that so far we have eliminated the following from legitimate ways to acquire beliefs – Identity justified from culture, God arguments, referring to scripture, faith, cultural determination, and arguments from authority.

Uncertainty and new arguments.

After the elimination of arguments for coming to hold religious beliefs, I need to expand my essay into more normative grounds to see how desirable religious beliefs are. If I have shown that the ways in which we come to hold these beliefs are unreasonable, you are probably at a loss as to how exactly coming to hold these beliefs can occur. You might be trying to reformulate the arguments, trying to find some way to establish God and justify your belief system. I want to focus, initially, on whether this is worth your time - indeed, many theologians spend their entire lives reinterpreting and reformulating.

The first thing that I have to say, rather sharply, is that the attempt in itself is somewhat contemptuous, and for these reasons: If I have addressed the usual ways in which people say they believe in religious claims to such a degree as to leave you with unjustified belief, then this belief is, for the reason that it is unjustified, not able to be the basis from which you begin to make new arguments. Such new claims will be of the kind ‘I think this is how I can have faith, formulated because I have faith, which is unjustified’. Also, if by some luck this formula produces a good argument, we can see how we cannot let it vindicate the original belief (that it is intended to) because that belief was unjustified. Using the above formula, no new argument amounts to carrying any more weight than the original unjustified premise (i.e. the argument amounts to no more than any other unjustified belief).

It is the case, then, that any new arguments cannot vindicate the original beliefs, lest those beliefs be explicitly and specifically established. New arguments must start the establishment of all beliefs afresh, with no scripture, no priests, no god arguments and no appeals to community able to fill in gaps. No supposed justifications that I have addressed in this essay, should they be agreed to be insufficient (and if there is not agreement I want to know why), are able to supplement any new arguments – because to think that they are thus able would make the endeavour akin to crafting a cord on which to string false pearls.

Naturally, people will not admit in the first place to having their justifications for their beliefs dealt with, even though any refutations they might have will still not roll off the tips of their tongues. So it goes on, then, that people continue to hold on to religious beliefs. Obviously this goes against the reason for having beliefs – truth. Finding out that beliefs have no reasonable connection to truth should lead to our disbelief in those things (which may continue in this case as agnosticism/negative atheism). What we are dealing with, though, has such a grip on people’s lives – indeed their very existences – that such beliefs necessarily die hard.

People need help with this, and hence the normative nature of what is to follow. If people were to talk to a priest in such a crisis, they would be consoled straight back into the fold in no time at all. I must do my best, therefore, to show religious belief now (further to being unreasonable) to be undesirable to cling onto.


----part three----
Coming soon.